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Climate Change, Collective Harm and Legitimate Coercion 
 
Elizabeth Cripps1 
 
Abstract 
 
Liberalism faces a tension between its commitment to minimal interference with 
individual liberty and the urgent need for strong collective action on global climate 
change. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. It does so on the one hand by 
defending an expanded model of collective moral responsibility, according to which a 
set of individuals can be responsible, qua “putative group”, for harm resulting from 
the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. On the other, it defends a 
collectivised version of the harm principle. The claim is that the collectivised harm 
principle pushes the burden of argument, against coercively enforced measures to 
curtail climate change and compensate its victims, onto the global elite collectively 
responsible for environmental harms. Some such potential arguments are briefly 
considered and rejected. 
 
Main text 
 
There is an urgent need to tackle global climate change. This is hard for liberals, or 
anyone else, to deny. However, there is a serious obstacle to doing so within the 
framework of liberalism – a school of thought centred, as Feinberg (1987, p. 14) has 
put it, on keeping liberty-limiting principles to a minimum. Any serious collective 
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attempt, at global or state level, to curtail climate change or mitigate its harmful 
effects would place limitations on the actions of individuals. It would, in other words, 
restrict their liberty.  
One instinctively appealing way out is to draw on the following combination of 
claims, all of which are sufficiently uncontroversial to be taken as assumptions for the 
purposes of this paper: that human activity causes climate change; that climate change 
harms people; that those responsible for harm have a prima facie duty to stop the 
harm and compensate its victims; and that this duty is at least prima facie enforceable. 
The third claim is taken from conventional morality; the fourth is the one almost 
universally acknowledged liberty-limiting principle: the harm principle.  
However – and here is the rub – applying the latter two claims requires identifying 
an agent responsible for the harm, who might accordingly be required to correct it. As 
has become clear in the debate over “polluter pays” strategies for allocating 
environmental costs, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down individuals 
responsible for climate change (e.g. Caney 2005). Some effects might be traced to 
specific states or corporations, but not all. Rather, as Kutz (2000, p. 171) puts it: 
‘Environmental damage is typically the result of the knowing but uncoordinated 
activity of disparate individuals, each of whose actions contributes only imperceptibly 
to the resulting harm.’ How, then, can it be argued that they cause harm, are morally 
responsible for global climate change, and could legitimately be coerced into 
changing their behaviour?2 
This paper proposes a way around this difficulty, by appealing to an expanded 
understanding of collective responsibility and a collectivised version of the harm 
principle. Liberalism can, I suggest, retain its core individualism – its focus on the 
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institutions to assist the global poor.  
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individual as the unit of moral value and its aim of protecting individual liberty for all 
– whilst acknowledging explicitly the potential for large numbers of individual 
humans to cause harm between them. 
Part I will defend a model of weak collective responsibility, according to which a 
number of individuals (a “putative group”) can be collectively responsible for harm 
resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts, even if there is no 
intention to harm, or even to act collectively. This goes beyond the work of May 
(1987, 1992), who has already expanded the idea of collective responsibility beyond 
the standard, corporate model. It also takes a distinct line from, although it draws 
some conclusions parallel to, Kutz’s (2000) discussion of environmental damage as an 
unstructured harm.  
Part II will defend a collectivised version of the harm principle, drawing on 
Kernohan’s (1998) defence of an accumulative harm principle. The claim is not that 
liberty restrictions are always legitimate in cases of collective (or individual) harm, 
but rather that responsibility for harm shifts the burden of argument onto those 
harming. Part III will briefly consider some such potential arguments in the case of 
climate change.  
Those to be held collectively responsible are, broadly put, Pogge’s ‘global elite’ 
(2002, p. 23) – westerners and the rich minority in poor countries – although more 
specific criteria will be sketched at the end of Part I. The harm is done to two sets of 
persons, to the extent of undermining their central capabilities or fundamental 
interests: those (generally the poor) whose chances of a flourishing life are already 
threatened by climate change, and future generations, including both the as-yet unborn 
and the current generation of children.  
 4 
Given this, coercively-imposed measures might be defended at either or both of 
two levels. Firstly, an attempt by the harming elite, or its subsets, to fulfil the 
collective duty to end environmental harm could involve the legitimate allocation of 
enforceable duties to individual members. Secondly, some legitimately-established 
authority at the level of the broader, global collectivity (containing also those harmed) 
might be entitled to restrict the harm-causing ability of the elite, thereby limiting the 
liberty of its members.  
However, it is worth stressing the limited nature of the claims advanced in this 
paper. My intention is to find space within liberalism for collective measures to tackle 
climate change, even if there is no neat causal link between “shares” of environmental 
harm and the actions of individuals. It is certainly not to suggest that there is now a 
cut and dried case for any institution, no matter how undemocratically established and 
how unfairly it distributes individual duties, to set itself up as a global environmental 
tsar and hand out coercively backed restrictions on individual action. 
 
I. Weak collective responsibility 
 
i. Bridging a “gap” in moral thought 
 
Climate change, alongside such other features of the modern world as global poverty 
and the global economic downturn, serves to illustrate the limitations of conventional 
moral thought. As Scheffler (2001, p. 40) puts it: 
 
[D]evelopments… [including] … increased economic and political interdependence… and the 
enormous growth in world population… have made it more difficult than ever to sustain the 
conception of human social relations as consisting primarily in small-scale interactions among 
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single individuals… [P]olitical and economic developments in one area of the globe often have 
rapid and dramatic effects on people in other areas… [H]uman behaviour now has effects on the 
natural environment that are unprecedented in scale. These environmental effects distribute 
themselves in complicated ways within and across national boundaries… 
 
Collections of individuals who do not constitute formalised, acknowledged groups can 
and do cause great, and morally regrettable, harms. The possibility thus raised by 
Scheffler (2001, pp. 32-47), which this paper will fill out, is that of morally derived 
reparative duties binding a number of individuals collectively, even though it would 
be inappropriate to blame them individually and they are not acting in combination 
through some social or institutional structure.  
That is not to advocate ignoring the question of what I, the individual, should do 
altogether. Far from it, given that my conclusion will be that it can sometimes be 
legitimate to interfere with individual liberty to prevent collective environmental 
harm: in other words, that there may be enforceable individual correlative duties. The 
claim is, rather, that the demands on individuals in such cases are most appropriately 
identified by reference to the harm for which we, collectively, are responsible, and our 
corresponding collective duty to do something about it.  
This section will lay out the model, sketch some implications in terms of duties, 
distinguish it from rival accounts by May and Kutz, and defend it by responding to 
some key objections. 
The claim to be defended is as follows: 
 
Weak collective responsibility claim 
A number of individuals who do not yet constitute a collectivity (either 
formally, with an acknowledged decision structure or informally, with some 
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vaguely defined common interest or goal) can be held morally collectively 
responsible for a harm which has been caused by the predictable aggregation of 
individual actions.3  
 
“Predictable” has a double meaning: individuals are acting predictably, in that they 
are acting in pursuit of their goals or interests, and it is predictable (reasonably 
foreseeable) that those actions, in combination, will result in harm.  
Consider the following situation.4 A number of teenagers, all independently, 
decide to swim in a small lake. They dive in, swim around very flashily and, between 
them, cause so much turbulence that a child also (independently) swimming in the 
lake is drowned. 
What is the appropriate moral judgement on these teenagers? None, individually, 
has harmed the child: the minor turbulence caused by one alone would not have done 
so. There is no (collective or individual) intention to harm. Nonetheless, it is as a 
result of the combination of their actions that the child drowns. Building on standard 
moral thinking and on an account offered by May (1992, pp. 106-112) of collective 
responsibility for inaction, I suggest that whether we hold the teenagers morally (as 
opposed to merely causally) responsible on a particular occasion is likely to depend 
on whether they could reasonably be expected to be aware of the danger. 
If they are all unaware of the child’s inability to swim well, of the likelihood that 
others besides themselves would be diving in, or of quite how much turbulence lots of 
teenagers jumping about in the water would create, it might be considered a tragic 
                                                 
3 The proposal here goes well beyond not only the standard, corporate notion of collective 
responsibility, which requires a formalised decision-making process, but also beyond the significant 
expansion of the notion already offered by May (1987, 1992). May defends the responsibility of 
informal groups such as mobs, as well as collective responsibility for inaction by a “putative group”. In 
the latter case, (1992, pp. 106-112), no group existed, but one could have been formed in time to 
prevent some harm from taking place. 
4 This is a variant of May’s example (2002, pp. 110-116).  
 7 
accident. If, however, they do not stop their behaviour when the risk becomes 
apparent, or behave in exactly the same way on another occasion, with another child, 
then I contend that they are collectively responsible.   
The argument, “It wasn’t just me – what I did wouldn’t have done any harm if 
there hadn’t been lots of others doing it as well” might have some appeal in saving the 
teenagers, qua individuals, from full responsibility. However, it seems sufficient to 
ascribe weak collective responsibility that the following condition is satisfied. 
 
Three-part sufficient condition for weak collective responsibility: 
• the individuals acted in ways which, in aggregate, caused harm, and 
which they were aware (or could reasonably be expected to have 
foreseen) would, in aggregate, cause harm (although each only 
intentionally performed his own act);  
• they were all aware (or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen) 
that there were enough others similarly placed (and so similarly 
motivated to act) for the combined actions to bring about the harm; and 
• the harm was collectively avoidable: by acting otherwise (which they 
could reasonably have done5), the individuals making up the putative 
group could between them have avoided the harm.  
 
                                                 
5 This should be understand as requiring that each individual had actual (non-terrible) alternatives – i.e. 
that the contributory individual actions were avoidable – rather than as suggesting that the individuals, 
taken only as individuals, acted unreasonably, or wrongly, in not pursuing those alternatives. The point 
being made in this paper is precisely that negatively derived individual environmental duties make 
sense only within a framework of collective responsibility: the harm is caused by, and could only be 
avoided, by combined actions. Nonetheless, it would be less plausible to hold the putative group 
responsible for harm if its members could not reasonably have acted otherwise – for example if each 
teenager were chased into the water by an axe-murderer, or driven mad by severe burns which he was 
attempting to soothe.  
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This model, if found acceptable, gives us a richer conceptual base from which to 
consider what we – and so what I – should be doing in the face of harms for which I 
do not seem to have individual responsibility but which, nonetheless, would not have 
occurred if I and others had acted differently.  
There is, of course, a great deal to be said about duties correlating to weak 
collective responsibility for harm. It would be interesting to consider not only the 
collective duty to end and/or repair the harm and individual duties arising as part of 
that, but also individual duties deriving from collective responsibility in the absence 
of, or alongside, any such collective effort. Each of us might, for example, have a duty 
to try to bring about a collective endeavour, often by promoting the establishment of 
collective decision-making structures where none exist. We might also have duties to 
cease acting in the way which made us a part of the harming putative group in the first 
place, and/or to act so far as possible to mitigate or end the harm directly. However, 
these supplementary individual duties lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
The relevant point for present purposes is as follows. When an individual is 
responsible for harm, that individual generally acquires a duty to cease to harm and 
often to make reparation for the damage already done. In cases of corporate 
responsibility for harm, similar moral requirements apply to the corporate (which will, 
of course, require its individual members to act in certain ways). To quote Kutz (2000, 
p. 200) on Union Carbide and the 1984 Bhopal tragedy: ‘Because the wrong that lay 
behind the gas leak is emergent at the group level, it makes sense that the duty of 
compensation should emerge at the group level too.’  
Accordingly, in cases of weak collective responsibility, the primary corresponding 
duty is naturally a collective one: to do something about the harm together. That is, to 
act, qua group, to bring about an end to the harm and/or to repair or compensate for 
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the damage. Such collective action would require individuals to act in certain ways, 
i.e. to fulfil derivative individual duties. This might involve: changing their individual 
actions to those available alternatives which would not, in combination, cause harm; 
participating in some scheme which would offset the potential damage done by the 
(continuing) combination of individual actions and so prevent the harm; or some 
combination of the two. Thus, assuming fairly-established decision-making structures 
and fairly-allocated duties, members of the harming putative group can be said to 
acquire morally-grounded individual duties. 
 
ii. Shared responsibility or collective responsibility? 
 
Subsection I.iii will rebuff some likely objections to the model laid out above. Firstly, 
however, given that this the idea of weak collective responsibility builds on existing 
work by May on collective inaction, I will briefly defend it against the rival account 
which he himself offers to accommodate at least some of the cases with which I am 
concerned. That is, his idea of shared responsibility. I will also clarify how my model 
differs from recent work by Kutz on environmental damage as an unstructured harm. 
May’s notion of shared responsibility ‘concerns the aggregated responsibilities of 
individuals, all of whom contribute to a result and for that reason are personally 
responsible, albeit often to different degrees, for a given harmful result’ (1992, p. 
107). Such responsibility is applied to cases of joint undertaking: where ‘the causal 
contribution of each person often cannot easily be ascertained, except to say that all 
parties played a necessary role in the harm, and that no one party played a sufficient 
role’ (p. 39). Rather than assign no responsibility or full responsibility to each 
individual, May (p. 42) advocates dividing responsibility: either by a straight division 
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of the harm, or (preferably) according to different roles, which could be used to assign 
responsibility for proportionally extensive or limited “parts” of the harm.  
There are two important distinctions between my account and his. Firstly, on 
May’s model, each individual has personal (individual) responsibility for some share 
of the harm. Thus, presumably, individuals, qua individuals, have a duty not to do 
their “bit” of the harm (or to make reparation). My claim is that the putative group is 
collectively responsible. The putative group, building on May’s own terminology, is 
understood as a set of individuals who do not yet constitute a group in the strong 
sense, but are nonetheless “grouped” by the predictable harmful impact of their 
combined actions and could plausibly form a group to tackle the harm.6 This has the 
significantly different implication of a primarily collective duty to end, or repair, the 
overall harm, from which certain individuals duties are derived. It is also, I suggest, 
more plausible. 
Consider the ways in which a number of individuals might “contribute to” a 
harmful result without being part of a group in any strong sense. In the most 
straightforward, a number of individuals each cause small harms, which sum together 
to form a larger harm but one no greater than the sum of its parts. Suppose ten 
children in a small village each steal an apple a day from a farmer’s orchard. The 
attribution of personal responsibility is unproblematic. 
Alternatively, each individual could contribute to the harm but without direct 
responsibility for any part of it. This could happen in two ways. Firstly, cases of 
concerted joint action, in which each individual knowingly contributes to an overall 
end which is either foreseeably or deliberately harmful. May, who is primarily 
concerned with such cases, uses the example (1992, p. 40) of cooperation to steal 
                                                 
6 ‘[P]utative groups [are those] in which people are sometimes capable of acting in concert but in which 
no formal organisation exists and, as a result, there is no decision-making apparatus.’ (May 1992, p. 
109) 
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some silver buttons.7 Secondly, however, individuals might contribute to a harm 
through actions which are not in themselves harmful (which may even be beneficial) 
and which are not intended to contribute to some common goal.8 The teenagers in the 
lake present one example. At a wider level, Feinberg (1987, p. 228) uses the example 
of sulphur dioxide emissions which, in combination, render dangerous the percentage 
of the gas in the air.  
In such cases, May’s strategy is unappealing. Recall his method for assigning 
personal responsibility. How are individuals to be assigned “pieces” of the harm, 
according to the roles they played, when their actions did not constitute the 
performance of roles in some deliberate collective endeavour? Yet it seems equally 
arbitrary simply to divide up the (perhaps very significant) harm, saying that each of n 
individuals was responsible for 1/nth of it. The point is precisely that the individual, 
qua individual, has not harmed. Nor has she contributed to a collective intentional act. 
Given this, it seems inappropriate to talk of each individual being assigned a share of 
direct personal responsibility, at all.  
Consider the alternative: collective responsibility. May himself (1992, p. 107) 
defines this as ‘the nondistributed responsibility of a group of people structured in 
such a way that action can occur that could not occur if the members were acting 
outside the group’. This is clearly a narrower, more conventional version than the 
weak collective responsibility model proposed here. But what the examples of the 
teenagers – or the polluters – bring out is that the cases have something important in 
common. 
                                                 
7 May borrows the example from Paige Keaton, W., ed., 1984.  
8 Although the actions are likely to be similar ones, it is at least possible that they could be different 
actions which combine predictably but unintentionally to bring about some harm. This brings out an 
additional distinction between my model and that of Kutz, one of whose jointly sufficient grounds for 
individual accountability for unstructured harms is participation in ‘a concrete way of life that 
generates these harms’ (2000, p. 186). 
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While the action is not collective in the strong sense of group (or corporate) action 
irreducible to the actions of individuals, the result (harm) could not have occurred 
were not those individuals situated, in relation to one another, in such a way that their 
pursuit of individual goals would have a certain predictable aggregative impact. It is 
only because of the way the individuals are grouped, in this very weak sense, that 
harm is done. Thus, it makes sense to assign moral responsibility collectively, albeit 
in a similarly weak sense, rather than attempt to divvy up the harm into individual 
“shares”.  
The second distinction is that my model covers a wider range of cases. There are 
some situations in which, although the combination of actions of a large number of 
individuals brings about harm, no individual’s contribution is necessary for that harm. 
In such Overdetermination Cases, the number of individual contributory actions is 
above the threshold at which harm is “triggered”. May, as we saw above, specifies 
that each individual’s contribution must be necessary. However, my model, which 
leaves this open, allows for Overdetermination Cases. This is crucial, given that it is 
frequently in such scenarios (for example, the aggregation of individual decisions to 
drive cars rather than use public transport, or to fly abroad for a holiday) that 
environmental harm is done. 
The model offered here can also be distinguished from Kutz’s account of 
unstructured collective harms (2000, pp. 171-191). Although, unlike May, he does 
consider Overdetermination Cases, and although he defends an individual duty to 
uphold attempts to tackle such collective harms, Kutz argues for this duty directly, 
rather than as derivative of a collective duty. Individuals, on his account, acquire such 
environmental duties because they can be held accountable for environmental harms 
on twofold grounds, neither of which he thinks would be sufficient in isolation. The 
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first basis for accountability is quasi-participatory,9 because of the individual’s 
participation in a harmful way of life, which might be viewed as a collective venture; 
the second is symbolic, or character-based.  
My claim is that the individuals are collectively responsible in the sense of being 
responsible qua putative group. They acquire potentially enforceable individual duties 
only through the fulfilment, or enforcement, of the corresponding collective duty. 
Thus, as I will elaborate in I.iii below, this model avoids the charge levelled against 
May, which might also be put to Kutz: of making demands of individuals, qua 
individuals, on basis of harms which they, as individuals, did not bring about.  
It is not clear how quasi-participation in a way of life and so-called symbolic 
responsibility can be regarded as strong enough to ground such demands in 
combination if they are assumed not to do so in isolation – and Kutz (2000, p. 186) 
states explicitly that neither alone is sufficient. The model offered here takes up the 
possibility of grounding responsibility in a “collective venture”, but in a sense broader 
than Kutz’s understanding thereof. It uses this, independent of any question of 
symbolic accountability, to ground (I suggest, more plausibly) collective and 
accordingly individual duties. Although Kutz (pp. 197-202) touches on the possibility 
of primarily holistic accountability, his discussion of such accountability focuses on 
structured collectives and he does not spell out how this would transfer to the 
unstructured case.  
 
iii. Objections 
 
                                                 
9 “Quasi”, Kutz (2000, p. 186) explains, ‘because there is no specific project to which individuals 
contribute’. 
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Having laid out the model of weak collective responsibility and defended it as both a 
genuine and a plausible alternative to other recent work, I will use this subsection to 
respond to three potential objections. The first can quickly be dismissed: appeal to the 
popular idea that moral responsibility requires intentionality and to the fact that there 
is no (collective or individual) intention to harm in cases such as that of the teenagers. 
Even at the individual level, it is often sufficient for the ascription of moral 
responsibility that an individual could reasonably have been expected to know that 
what she was doing would cause harm.  
However, the objection might be rephrased as follows: not only is there no 
intention to harm, there is no intention to act collectively at all. The response to this is 
to reiterate the twofold predictability condition in (i), above, according to which each 
individual can be expected not only to know that the combined actions of all those 
similarly placed (and so similarly motivated) would cause harm, but also that she and 
sufficient others are similarly placed. In this sense, I suggest, although there was no 
intention to act collectively, the collective result was reasonably foreseeable. The 
discussion, below, of the third condition – avoidability – should reinforce this point: 
something was done which not only should have been foreseen but could have been 
prevented.  
The second objection goes as follows. I have made it clear that weak collective 
responsibility, unlike May’s shared responsibility, accommodates Overdetermination 
Cases. Above, I rejected the possibility of assigning direct responsibility for shares of 
the harm to individuals. However, collective responsibility for harm will bring with it 
not only collective but also correlative individual reparative duties. If what an 
individual did made no difference, why should she acquire such duties? 
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The short answer is that she is a member of the relevant putative group: the 
individual may not be personally responsible but she is one of those collectively so, 
and acquires individual correlative duties in the same way as members of a harming 
corporation would do so. This, however, only pushes back the problem. Why, if her 
actions have made no perceptible difference, should she count as a member of this 
weakly defined group at all? 
One response is to appeal to precisely the point that any one of the individuals was 
similarly unnecessary. Thus, it would be arbitrary (and unfair) to identify the harming 
group as all acting in that way less one specific individual. This draws on the 
plausible idea defended by Murphy (1993, p. 278) of morality as a collective project: 
the ‘natural thought… that it is objectionable to expect agents to take up the slack 
caused by the non-compliance of others’. 
However, the individual might retort that she is not expecting any such 
objectionable unfairness, because she does not think any of the others should be held 
accountable either – i.e. that it is not possible to identify a “putative group” 
responsible for the harm. To respond to this, I need to expand on the third part of the 
three-part condition for weak collective responsibility: the collective avoidability 
requirement. Although none of the individuals making up the putative group could 
individually have prevented the harm, they could have done so between them, 
presuming they could reasonably have acted otherwise from how they did.  
In Overdetermination Cases, the harm would have been avoided had only most of 
those held collectively responsible acted differently. Thus, the objector can correctly 
point out that it could have been avoided without her changing her own behaviour (if 
enough others did so). But all members of the putative group have (by definition) 
reasonable alternative actions available to them, and the harm would not have 
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occurred had all the members of any one of many different possible substantial 
subsets pursued those alternatives. All the members of the putative group, including 
our hypothetical objector, are potential members of the harm-avoiding subset. The 
combination of this with the other elements of the condition (specifying that the harm 
results predictably from the combined actions of the set of individuals) takes those 
weakly collectively responsible out of the realm of positive responsibility and into 
that of negative responsibility, whilst maintaining the putative group as the locus of 
responsibility.  
To hammer the point home, consider the following variants on a simple example. 
In all cases, a footbridge is unsafe and a person, Fred, is in the water below the bridge. 
In the first case, there are no signs that it is in anything less than good repair. I step on 
the bridge. It breaks. Fred is harmed. However, I intended no harm and could not 
reasonably have been expected to foresee it. I am not morally responsible.10 In the 
second case, there are clear signs that the bridge is in a state of poor repair.11 
Moreover, I can see Fred in the water. I step on the bridge. I could reasonably have 
foreseen that my actions would result in harm and it is plausible to hold me morally 
responsible.12 
                                                 
10 I take this to be the standard view although it is not uncontroversial. Thomson (1990, pp. 227-248) 
has argued that ‘we have claims against others that they not cause us harm’ (p. 228) without restricting 
the harms to those intended or even reasonably foreseeable. Such claims should be considered, she 
contends, as constraints on the action of those they are claims against, even though in cases of 
unpredictable, unintended harm, the harming individual cannot be said to be at fault. However, as far as 
this paper is concerned the relevant question is whether the individual or putative group in the later 
cases (where there is reasonable foreseeability) can be held collectively responsible, not whether there 
is a claim against the individual (or group) even without foreseeability. 
11 To avoid questions about the extent to which Fred himself might be held responsible for his fate (for 
sitting under an unsafe bridge likely to be crossed by pedestrians), we can assume either that the bridge 
appears perfectly safe to him (perhaps the damage is only visible if it is approached by a higher path, 
and he walked up beside the river, or perhaps the sign indicating the disrepair is not visible from below 
the bridge) or that he cannot be expected to have foreseen the risk (say, he is a child or mentally 
handicapped). 
12 This might appear to run contrary to the Doctrine of Double Effect: ‘[T]he thesis that it is sometimes 
permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.’ (Foot 1978, p. 20) 
However, the DDE does not rule out the possibility that it is sometimes impermissible to bring about an 
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In the third case, the bridge can hold one person but not two. Wilma is approaching 
the bridge from exactly the same distance, at the same speed, as me. There are no 
signs that the bridge is weak. We step onto it at the same time; it breaks. The 
combination of our actions has caused the harm to Fred but we are not, I suggest, 
morally responsible: it is not reasonable to have expected us to foresee the harm or act 
in time to prevent it. 
In the fourth case, the situation is as above except that there are warning signs on 
each side of the bridge. Wilma and I see these in plenty of time to stop but each of us 
steps onto the bridge regardless. We are collectively responsible for the harm, which 
we could have foreseen and could have prevented.  
Fifthly, there are three people approaching the bridge. We all step onto it at the 
same time, despite warning signs. I might tell myself that my acting (or not acting) as 
I did made (or would have made) no difference to Fred, because two people besides 
me stepped onto the bridge and two would have been enough to break it. Each of the 
others might say the same. Does this render the harm causeless, or at least render it 
impossible to ascribe moral responsibility? Surely not.  
Imagine how Fred might respond if the three of us were to scramble out of the 
water and wander on our way, each claiming: “Well, it wasn’t my fault.” He could 
very legitimately call after us: “Oi! You [plural] got me into this mess. Now get me 
out of it.” If he had the energy, he could expand: “You knew what would happen if 
you all stepped onto the bridge, you saw the signs in time to decide to do otherwise. 
Any two of you could have prevented me from being hurt by waiting a couple of 
minutes. But you didn’t wait: you went right ahead and broke the bridge.”  
                                                                                                                                            
effect even obliquely. Moreover, it has been called into doubt by philosophers including Foot herself. 
(See 1978, pp. 19-31) 
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In such cases as this, the boundaries of the putative group are clearly defined. 
However, there are cases where contribution to harm is not through some all-or-
nothing action (stepping on to a bridge) but through doing too much or too little of 
something. This raises the third objection. If there is no appropriate cut off point for 
inclusion as one of those collectively responsible, people whose contributions are 
comparatively tiny could become members of putative groups collectively responsible 
for hugely significant harms. At the extreme, they could become responsible for such 
harms merely by existing. This is counterintuitive. For example, almost everyone has 
some carbon footprint, but that does not necessarily render everyone including (say) a 
South American rainforest tribe collectively responsible for environmental harm.  
A plausible suggestion would be that a person becomes one of the group 
collectively responsible for harm once her contribution exceeds the amount such that, 
were everyone contributing only to that level, there would be no harm.13 This, I 
suggest, builds on the idea that the “cause” of a harm picked out in discussions of 
responsibility does not include all the actions and events necessary for that harm, but 
rather the one or two which stand out. The relevant question, as Feinberg (1987, p. 
179) puts it, is: ‘What was different this time? What unusual cause accounts for this 
unusual result?’ 
Consider another variant on the bridge example. Suppose it can hold up to four 
people of an average weight of 65kg. Four people are approaching the bridge and all 
know this. Suppose for the sake of argument that I can tell by looking at the other 
three (as they can me) that their body weight is around or just below the average. We 
all step onto the bridge. However, I am carrying a 40kg rucksack. This pushes our 
combined weight above the limit. The bridge breaks and Fred is harmed. It was the 
                                                 
13 As Singer points out, in terms of even stabilising climate change, residents of the US, Japan and 
Western nations are already several times above this level. (2002, p. 35)   
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combination of my weight, my rucksack’s weight, and the weights of Wilma and the 
other two people, as well as various other factors relating to the bridge being in its 
state of disrepair in the first place, that resulted in the harm to Fred. Nonetheless, there 
seems to be some special work being done by my carrying the rucksack, which makes 
me peculiarly accountable. Given this (and given the foreseeability of the harm, under 
the circumstances), I am morally responsible for the harm: not the others, and not 
some “we” including them and me. 
Now consider a seventh variant: Wilma and I are both carrying 20kg rucksacks, 
and each of the two of us knows this. Then, combining the considerations behind 
attribution of responsibility in the fourth and sixth cases, she and I are collectively 
responsible for the harm. The additional trigger, or unusual cause, is foreseeably and 
preventably the combination of our actions.  
In the final case, three of us are carrying such rucksacks. Building on the fifth case, 
although only two would be needed to bring the weight above the limit, the putative 
group consisting of the three of us (and not the fourth person) is collectively 
responsible for the predictable, preventable harm. It is in precisely the same way, I 
suggest, that the putative group consisting of those with a carbon footprint above the 
level at which there would be no harm were everyone polluting only to that level is 
collectively responsible for environmental harm.  
 
II. Towards legitimate coercion 
 
i) A collective harm principle 
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So far, I have suggested a way around the problem of identifying specific individuals, 
states or corporations directly (personally) responsible for shares of environmental 
harm. The second strand of the argument is to motivate the coercive enforcement of 
the individual duties acquired in the process of fulfilling the collective duty. I do this 
by advancing the following principle: 
 
Collective harm principle 
Curtailment of individual freedom, by a legitimate collective authority, is prima 
facie legitimate when the individuals are part of a group or putative group 
collectively responsible for harm, in the strong or weak sense, and the duties 
imposed on the individuals are fairly allocated as part of a collective endeavour 
to end that harm or compensate its victims. 
 
This is a collective version of the harm principle, a tenet central to liberalism, which 
was identified as a core assumption at the start of this paper. In its original 
formulation, the principle is as follows (Mill 1859, p. 14): 
 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others.  
 
However, it is important to clarify which element of this is the “core tenet” to which I 
refer. Mill’s principle can be split into two parts: 
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(Implicit) The positive claim: that it is sometimes permissible to limit the liberty 
of action of an individual human being in order to prevent his harming others. 
 
(Explicit) The negative claim: that this is the only circumstance in which such 
interference is permissible. 
 
My focus is on the implicit positive claim rather than the negative claim, which, in 
any case, is not generally adhered to in so-called liberal societies.  
Before defending the expansion of the principle in II.ii, below, it is worth also 
making explicit the following points. Firstly, unlike Kernohan (1998), whose 
arguments I will draw on and who is concerned specifically with state level authority, 
I am not restricting discussion to existing political institutions. As noted in the 
introductory section, this leaves open the question of where exactly the decision-
making body is: at the level of what was the putative and has since become a 
structured group, fulfilling its collective duty; at some subset level (e.g. a Western 
state government), or at a broader, global level, imposing fulfilment of the collective 
duty on the harming putative group. 
Secondly, I am not suggesting that coercion is always appropriate in such cases. 
Hardly anyone would make this claim even with regards to the individual harm 
principle. Rather, the harm principle seems to shift the burden of proof, so that it is 
those harming who have to provide a legitimate reason as to why they should not be 
coerced out of it. 
 
ii. Defending collectivisation 
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Although the harm principle has standardly been taken to apply only to harm for 
which the individual concerned is directly personally responsible, its collectivisation 
seems to me not only compatible with, but essential to, upholding the core values of 
liberalism.  
There is nothing in Mill’s original wording, above, to restrict the principle to harm 
caused by individuals, qua isolated individuals. Indeed, the broader collective version 
is in keeping with his own specification (1859, p. 14) that ‘[t]he… part of the conduct 
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others’. It has 
been precisely my contention in Part I above that, in situations where harm results 
predictably from the combination of actions of similarly motivated individuals, each 
individual’s action must unavoidably be regarded as “concerning others”. 
Harm is done – and individual human lives are circumscribed – not only by 
individuals, states and corporations but also collectively, by individuals making up 
only putative groups. Moreover, the modern liberal focus is on protecting equal 
liberty, or liberty as compatible with like liberty for everyone else.14 This was made 
explicit at state level by Rawls (1971, p. 266) and later transposed by liberal 
cosmopolitans to the global level (see for example Beitz 1975, 1983). Given this, a 
consistent liberalism sensitive to the current climate seems to me bound to allow for 
political action to prevent such collective harm. 
A more specific defence, against potential objections to the collectivised principle, 
can be borrowed from Kernohan (1998, pp. 83-85). He defends a slightly broader 
accumulative harm principle legitimating policies which violate state neutrality where 
individual activity ‘is part of an accumulative activity which brings about harm to 
others’ (p. 76). His argument consists of responses to three worries, two of which are 
                                                 
14 See also the defence against libertarian objections, in III.ii. 
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relevant here.15 Firstly, that ‘[t]he individual’s own actions may be harmless and 
would not be liable to regulation if others were not taking similarly individually 
harmless actions. It appears that the individual is being penalised for what other 
people do.’ (p. 83)  
This, as Kernohan suggests and as should be clear from Part I, misapplies our 
intuitions. Individuals are penalised for their own actions, albeit in the context of 
others doing the same: ‘If they had been doing something else instead, no penalty 
would have been assigned.’ (Kernohan 1998, p. 83) It is a putative group, of which 
she is knowingly (or reasonably foreseeably) a part, which is being held accountable, 
and it is as a member of the group that she is penalised.16 
The other concern addressed by Kernohan (1998, p. 83) is that individuals could 
become subject to ‘overly onerous duties’. However, he (p. 85) points out that similar 
worries could be raised with respect to the individual harm principle, without 
requiring us to reject it altogether.  
 
Suppose a man is wildly flailing about with his fists… [He is] liable to the imposition of a 
duty which will prevent him from harming bystanders. But what duty? Many duties would 
succeed in preventing harm: Thou shalt not hit others. Thou shalt not flail about with thy fists. 
Thou shalt immediately commit suicide. Thou shalt present thyself to the nearest servant of 
the state for summary execution… Only the first of these, however, is a  contender, for though 
the [harm principle] licenses the imposition of duties to prevent harm, it must be 
supplemented with considerations of justice and efficiency to determine what particular duties 
to impose. 
 
                                                 
15 The third (1998, p. 83) focuses on the cases of pornography and cultural oppression, with which he is 
particularly concerned.   
16 This is a parallel point to that advanced by May (1992, p. 112) against  thinkers who reject his 
collective inaction model on the grounds that individual responsibility cannot change just because of 
membership of a group. 
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Similarly with the collective principle, the point ‘is to indicate when it is permissible 
to impose maximally equitable, minimally onerous harm-preventing obligations’ 
(1998, p. 85). As I have already stressed, the requirements that any coercively 
imposed duties be equitably assigned, and that they be made by collective institutions 
meeting strict criteria of legitimacy and representativeness, are prerequisites for their 
legitimate imposition, although there is no space here to expand on these further 
conditions. 
 
III. Climate change and coercion: rights and excuses 
 
i. Environmental harm and excuses  
 
I have defended two ideas which, I suggest, can be used to overcome the apparent 
tension between the need for strong collective environmental decision-making and the 
liberal doctrine of minimal interference with individual liberty: a model of weak 
collective responsibility for harms resulting predictably from the aggregation of 
individual actions, and a collectivised version of the harm principle.  
Climate change occurs predictably through the aggregation of our individual acts. 
Those who cross the threshold for membership in the harming putative group, as 
specified in I.iii, roughly equate to the global elite. Different action by any number of 
potential subsets, each containing many but not necessarily all of us, would have 
avoided harm.17 Moreover, as members of that global elite, living well above 
                                                 
17 For the purposes of this paper, I am concerned with the ongoing harm done by current generations of 
the global elite. However, the argument could plausibly be extended to include in the putative group 
members of past generations beyond the point (itself a matter for debate) at which the harm became 
reasonably foreseeable. This would of course raise further questions, beyond the scope of this paper, of 
the fairness (or otherwise) of imposing more stringent duties on current members of the putative group 
because those now dead cannot be made to do their share.  
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subsistence level, we had reasonable, lower-carbon alternative actions available to 
us.18 The resulting harm impacts (also predictably) on those already threatened by 
climate change and future generations.19  
However, as stressed in II.i above, not even the most avid defender of the harm 
principle would claim that coercion is always appropriate in cases of individual or 
collective harm. Rather, the principle shifts the burden of argument (against coercion) 
onto those harming. The next two subsections will briefly consider and reject some of 
the ways in which this might be done. The first level at which objections might be 
raised is against the attribution of weak collective responsibility for harm and 
correlative duties. I will address this here, before turning in III.ii to the possibility of 
appeal to individual rights to veto coercive enforcement of such duties.  
Certain excuses are standardly used to argue that an individual who is responsible 
for some harm, has nonetheless acted permissibly.20 The harm is not morally 
unacceptable and does not give rise to the usual correlative duties. Consider the 
following scenarios:  
 
                                                 
18 See also the dismissal of Excuse (1) in the next subsection. To reiterate Footnote 5, that is not to say 
that, considered only as individuals, we should have pursued those alternatives, or even that we should 
necessarily do so now other than as part of a collective endeavour. 
19 Of course, in referring harm to future generations, I run the gauntlet of the Non-Identity Problem 
(Parfit 1984, pp. 358-359). Given that future generations if we tackle climate change will not be 
composed of the same individuals as if we don’t, how can we have been said to have harmed individual 
members of future generations unless they have so low a quality of life that it would be better for them 
not to have lived? I will not add to the wealth of discussion on this tricky philosophical point (e.g. 
Parfit 1986, Woodward 1986, 1987, Weinberg, 2008). Instead, I note, briefly, that taking the NIP 
seriously has far-reaching and intuitively repugnant consequences, as it would render morally 
permissible almost any policy which changes the circumstances of only the as-yet-unborn, so long as it 
at the same time affected who those future generations were. Moreover, although I will not defend this 
here, I think it plausible to skirt the NIP by specifying that when I refer to “harming future generations” 
I mean limiting the life prospects of individuals within those generations (whoever they turn out to be) 
by leaving them with circumstances within which their scope to flourish is limited in comparison with 
ours.  
20 I acknowledge the distinction, in legal philosophy, between “excuse” and “justification” (e.g. Austin 
1956, Robinson 1975, Husak 2005). However, with the moral distinction itself a matter for debate, and 
nothing hinging on it as far as this paper is concerned, I will understand moral “excuses” as also 
including justifications.  
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1) Unacceptable cost to self: the cost to the individual concerned, of not bringing 
about the harm, is too high. 
2) Worse alternatives: in not causing this harm, the individual would cause (or 
fail to prevent) some other, far greater harm. 
3) Consent: the person (or persons) being harmed has (have) given her (their) 
free informed consent to the harm. 
 
Let us begin with (1). The most severe costs have already been excluded by the 
specification, as one of the conditions for weak collective responsibility, that 
contributing individuals had reasonable alternative actions available to them. 
Generally, moreover, the force of this excuse depends on the cost compared with the 
cost of the harm to the person harmed. In the collective environmental case, any such 
claim seems wildly implausible, at least as regards the global elite. As Shue (1992, p. 
394) points out, the interests at stake for those harmed are ‘vital interests—survival 
interests’. Much of our greenhouse gas output serves luxury purposes (e.g. Shue 1993, 
pp. 54-58).  
Turning to the second get-out clause, the most plausible version would be that we 
avoid worse harm by focusing on helping today’s global poor, rather than tackling 
climate change. On the face of it, this could seem convincing. Consider, for example, 
a dilemma faced by an individual in the UK concerned both by the plight of those in 
developing countries and by the threat of climate change. Should she buy fair trade 
fruit, benefiting farmers in the developing world, or should she buy British and cut 
down on air miles? 
This complex issue merits much more space than I will give it here. I certainly 
would not deny the urgent claims (undoubtedly of humanity, arguably of justice) of 
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the global poor on the wealthy elite. However, I will note, briefly, the following. 
Firstly, the poor (or many of them) are already harmed by climate change. While it is 
sometimes plausible that harming someone can be in their all-things-considered 
interest (if the harm is a side-effect of some activity conferring a greater benefit), a 
strong empirical argument would be needed to show that the overall benefits even to 
the poor in this generation are higher than the costs. Given that the primary 
beneficiaries of climate change are the global elite, through activities only some of 
which can be said (as with global fair trade) to benefit the global poor, it is unlikely 
that such an argument could be made. 
Given this, the case made above for collective responsibility for harm, motivating a 
collective duty to end that harm and aid its victims, would still stand. A detailed 
discussion of what I have called supplementary individual duties is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but there is a distinction between what we are required to do together 
and what each individual should do in the absence of any such collective endeavour. 
The point brought out by this paper is precisely that such individual dilemmas as that 
of the well-intentioned individual above are not most helpfully considered in 
isolation. Ensuring that the costs are not borne, directly or indirectly, by the world’s 
poorest, would be one of the factors determining a fairly distributed, collectively-
organised attempt to tackle climate change. 
Moreover, secondly, even given a convincing empirical argument for the claim that 
climate change overall is more beneficial than harmful to the global poor, for example 
through the industrialisation of countries such as China and India (see also Footnote 
27, below), there would remain the problem that refusing to tackle climate change 
would simply shore up greater problems for future generations. So long as climate 
change gets worse, poverty can be expected to do the same. 
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The third excuse, Consent, has to be evaluated with regard to both present and 
future victims. It seems obvious that future generations not only could not, in practice, 
but would not, in principle, consent to being left with a world damaged to the extent 
of severely limiting their potential to live flourishing lives.21 To make the point with 
an analogy, suppose my neighbour says to me: “I want to have a party, with a giant 
bonfire, as a result of which your garden will be damaged by smoke and piled up with 
rubbish. This puts yours and your family’s health at risk. You are not invited to the 
party. Do you consent?” Unless I am altruistic to the point of masochism, I will not.22  
With regard to current generations, the consent excuse is familiar from cases of 
harm to a specific individual or group: the African worker, it is suggested, consents to 
take a job with enormous health risks; the poor African American community chooses 
to allow waste to be dumped on its land in return for payment; poor countries consent 
to take waste from the West. Such cases have been extensively discussed by Shrader-
Frechette (2002, pp. 71-93 and 124-129) and I will confine myself to three brief 
points. 
Firstly, whatever the alleged plausibility of appeal to consent in cases of specific 
environmental harms, usually where there is at least some notional payment to those 
harmed, it is (even) less plausible to claim consent in cases where the harm is done to 
the global poor as a whole, through global climate change.  
Secondly, even in those narrower cases, the claim that there has been free informed 
consent by those harmed often falls apart upon investigation. Often, consent turns out 
to be by some not necessarily representative subgroup or external body. (See for 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed discussion, see Shrader-Frechette’s (2002, pp. 105-113) treatment of harm to 
future generations through (allegedly) permanent geological disposal of nuclear waste. 
22 The NIP might be raised again here, the claim being that future individuals would consent to actions 
which bring about a future world (even a damaged one) in which they exist rather than having no life at 
all. However, I refer the reader to Footnote 19 and to the third point made (below) in the discussion of 
current generations. 
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example Shrader-Frechette 2002, pp. 124-129.) Moreover, the four requirements for 
such free informed consent are often unsatisfied: full disclosure of information about 
the risk, competence of victims to evaluate it; victims understanding the danger; and 
voluntariness (Shrader-Frechette 2002, p. 77).  
Thirdly, cases where individuals do consent to being exploited serve not to show 
that an act was permissible, but rather to indicate that consent, whether or not it is 
necessary, is not sufficient for moral permissibility. There is something wrong about a 
situation in which a person has to accept a threat to some fundamental interest, such 
as health, in order to protect some other such interest, for example nutrition. The fact 
that they do, in practice, accept it does not protect the harmer or harmers from 
negative moral judgement.23  
 
ii. A “right” to pollute? 
 
Having dismissed the moral “excuses”, above, now consider another way in which 
members of the global elite might protest against the coercive enforcement of 
environmental duties, by any collective authority. This is by appeal to alleged 
individual rights, which such enforcement would violate.24  
The possibility of rights protecting individuals against application of the harm 
principle has long been acknowledged by its proponents. As already stressed, Mill 
does not regard harm to others as a sufficient condition for legitimate interference. 
Rather, he argues (1859, pp. 83-84): ‘As soon as any part of a person’s conduct 
affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the 
                                                 
23 Shue (1999, p. 41) makes a similar point. 
24 This might also be framed as a fifth moral excuse, the idea being that, even if there is an individual 
duty to comply with collectively-acquired environmental duties, this clashes with individual rights and 
so is overridden. However, this can be dismissed by pointing out that it is perfectly possible to have a 
right to do something which is nonetheless morally wrong. See Waldron 1981 or Steiner 1996. 
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question of whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering 
with it, becomes open to discussion.’ Corresponding to this “general welfare” is a 
system of social rights, and it is only when actions harming others fall outside their 
sphere that the state can interfere with individual freedom. 
This paper does not offer a purely utilitarian argument and, like many liberals, I 
do not uphold Mill’s eschewal (1859, p. 15) of natural or human rights. Thus, rather 
than remain within the framework of social rights grounded in overall welfare, the 
question here is more general: what rights might individuals in this generation’s 
global elite have such that, while it is unfortunate that what they are doing results in 
harm to others, they have a perfect right to do it, the others have no right that they not 
do it, and they cannot legitimately be coerced into not doing it?  
Clearly, the appeal cannot be to a right to unrestricted negative liberty, as this 
would simply beg the question: it is precisely the legitimacy of limiting such liberty to 
avoid harm which is under discussion. Such a right would undermine the whole idea 
of the harm principle. Moreover, it would not be able to carry the argument. There are 
negative freedoms at stake on both sides of the debate. The liberty of a resident of a 
Mexico City shanty town is restricted if he attempts to take his asthmatic child into a 
private health spa, but is forcibly stopped.25 
Nor will self-ownership, alone, do the necessary work, for it is not merely our own 
bodies and our own labour that we use to pollute. Rather, what are required for 
members of this generation to have an all-trumping right to continue to act in the ways 
which in combination produce harmful climate change, are not only strong self-
ownership rights, but also some very stringent rights of ownership of natural 
resources. These would have to be strong enough to justify not only using up finite 
                                                 
25 This is a parallel to the example offered by Cohen (1995, p. 58) against the libertarian: of the woman 
whose negative liberty is restricted when she lacks the money to pay for a Selfridges sweater and so is 
prevented from carrying it out of the shop. 
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resources, but also the devastating impact this use has on potentially unlimited 
resources such as water and air.  
Full discussion of this point would require a detailed analysis of (particularly 
libertarian) attempts to derive property rights. However, it is enough for now to point 
out that it is unclear how a plausible derivation of such rights could be provided and, 
given the severity of the harm in question, the onus is on polluters to come up with 
such an account. Until they do, they have one significant argument the less against the 
legitimacy of coercive enforcement of environmental duties.26  
 
This completes the twofold argument of this paper: for a collectivised understanding 
of moral responsibility for harm and a collectivised harm principle. In closing, I stress 
again that this is only one step towards defending collective environmental decision-
making and its coercively-backed implementation (at whichever level). Before they 
could legitimately be imposed on individuals, environmental duties would have to 
satisfy further conditions. These conditions would apply not only to the fairness of the 
way in which individual restrictions are distributed (including such factors as the cost 
to individuals of complying) but to the representativeness and legitimacy of the 
institution (state-level, global or somewhere in between) which distributed them. 
                                                 
26 A possible further objection is that “rights to pollute”, grounded in entitlements to some share of the 
world’s resources, could more plausibly be claimed by those in polluting developing countries, such as 
China and India, than by those in Western countries who have long exceeded the level at which, were 
everyone to emit at that level, there would be no environmental harm. I cannot here give this the 
detailed analysis it deserves. However, the fact that others have done more harm (and for longer) is not 
generally taken as excuse (or justification) for doing harm oneself. Moreover, such considerations as 
equality in terms of opportunity to flourish, as well as past contribution to harm, would certainly be 
part of determining the fairness of an allocation of individual (or state) duties as part of a collective 
attempt to tackle climate change – which fairness, as I have already stressed, would be a further 
condition on the legitimate enforcement of environmental duties. This might lead to the conclusion that 
China, for example, does not have the same duties to cut pollution as (say) the US. To say we are all 
part of the collective required to tackle climate change is not thereby to claim that the same sacrifices 
should be required of each of us.  
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Indicating what such conditions would be is a massive project, but it is not the task of 
the current paper.  
That is, simply, to resolve the apparent tension highlighted in the opening. The 
problem of climate change undoubtedly calls for collective action but this does not 
require us to abandon what is most central to, and morally compelling about, 
liberalism. Such solutions could fit naturally within a liberal world view which seeks 
to protect the sphere of the individual but to do so for all individuals, and is, 
accordingly, prepared to curtail where necessary the liberty of those individually or 
collectively responsible for harm in order to preserve that of those harmed. 
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